





































Abstract - This paper studies Collective Identification Procedures in a finite lattice when the standard 
Independence axiom is dropped and replaced with an Independent Qualified Certification requirement. 
 






Stefano Vannucci, Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università di Siena 1 Introduction
Collective identiﬁcation procedures (CIPs) are meant to model the wide class
of more or less formal protocols that are used in order to identify the legit-
imate members of certain associations, clubs, or communities. In the last
decade, some work has been devoted to the formal social-choice-theoretic
study of CIPs. The bulk of the extant literature has focussed on two essen-
tially disjoint classes of procedures namely those which satisfy a counterpart
of the arrowian social-choice-theoretic independence property including of
course the self-certiﬁcation-based ‘libertarian’ rule, and those which rely on
some cooptation principle (see e.g. Samet and Schmeidler (2003), Çengelci
and Sanver (2005), Sung and Dimitrov (2003), Kasher and Rubinstein (1996),
Dimitrov, Sung and Xu (2003)). In the present collective identiﬁcation set-
ting, Independence establishes that membership of each population unit does
only depend on the assessment of her qualiﬁcations on the part of all popu-
lation units to the eﬀect of disregarding the qualiﬁcations of units to assess
each other. In turn, cooptation principles amount to allowing some asym-
metries among more or less active and passive members in the nomination
process, including possibly the distinction between ‘founding’ members and
‘others’.
This paper is mainly devoted to those CIPs that rely on the principle
of Independent Qualiﬁed Certiﬁcation (IQC): membership requires certiﬁca-
tion/approval by another qualiﬁed unit namely by another member. Clearly
enough, the IQC principle is not consistent with Independence. However,
it does not rule out cooptation altogether. Therefore, a further Collective
Self-Determination property (a generalization of a condition due to Samet
and Schmeidler (2003)) is introduced to the eﬀect of ruling out cooptation.
Moreover, a Participatory Certiﬁcation condition ensuring that membership
is voluntary is also considered. Several CIPs satisfying various combinations
o ft h o s er e q u i r e m e n t sa r ei d e n t i ﬁed and analyzed. It should be remarked that
while the extant literature is typically concerned with the boolean lattice of
subsets of the universal (ﬁnite) set of agents, our analysis is pursued -along
the lines of Monjardet (1990)1- in the considerably more general framework
1Monjardet (1990) is in fact concerned with arrowian i.e. ‘independent’ aggregation
rules in semi-lattices. Our IQC-consistent CIPs may be regarded as specialized ‘non-
independent’ aggregation rules in lattices. In a more specialized setting Miller (2006)
does also heavily rely on semi-latticial-theoretic properties (‘join-separability’ and ‘meet-
separability’). In contrast, Ballester and García-Lapresta (2005) is focussed on sequential
1of an arbitrary ﬁnite lattice. The choice of such a general environment allows
one to accommodate the cases of abstention and of many-valued member-
ships2. The present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to
a presentation of the model, and the results. Section 3 provides some short
remarks about possible extensions of the analysis.
2 Collective Identiﬁcation Procedures with In-
dependent Qualiﬁed Certiﬁcation
2.1 Notation and Characterizations
Let L =( L,6) be a ﬁnite lattice namely a ﬁnite partially ordered set3 such
that for any x,y ∈ L both the greatest lower bound x∧y and the least upper
bound x∨y of {x,y} do exist4.Ajoin irreducible element of L is any j ∈ L
such that for any x,y ∈ L if j = x ∨ y then j ∈ {x,y}.T h es e to fa l lj o i n
irreducible elements of L is denoted J∗: it is also assumed that #J∗ ≥ 2
in order to avoid tedious qualiﬁcations or trivialities. The following analysis
refers to an arbitrary but ﬁxed JL ⊆ J∗such that #JL ≥ 25.
A Collective Identiﬁcation Procedure (CIP) on JL is a function F : LJL →
L. For any pair F,F0 of CIPs on JL, it will be written F 0 5 F whenever
F0(x) 6 F(x) for all x ∈ LJL.
The present work will be mainly focussed on the following properties of
CIPs:
Independent Qualiﬁed Certiﬁcation (IQC): For any j ∈ JL and
identiﬁcation procedures with several degrees of membership.
2S e en o t e5b e l o w .
3Thus, by deﬁnition, 6 is a transitive, reﬂexive and antisymmetric binary relation on
L.
4For any A ⊆ L, ∧x∈Ax and ∨x∈Ax are deﬁned in the obvious way.
5Notice that the extant literature on collective identiﬁcation procedures is typically
focussed on the special boolean lattice (P(N),⊆),w h e r eN is the ﬁnite population of
agents. In that lattice, the join-irriducible elements are the atoms i.e. the singletons.
Thus the standard case with set of agents N reduces to a special instance of our model
with L =2 N, 6=⊆ and JL = J∗ ' N.
When agents are allowed to abstain one has L =3 N, while 6 reduces to the component-
wise partial order, and JL ⊂ J∗, JL ' N.
A similar approach can be applied to the case of several degrees of memberships.
2x ∈ LJL such that j 6 F(x) there exists i ∈ JL,i 6= j such that i 6 F(x)
and j 6 xi.
Participatory Certiﬁcation (PC): For any x ∈ LJL and any j ∈ JL,
if j 6 F(x) then j 6 xj.
Collective Self-Determination (CSD): For any x,x0 ∈ LJL if [j 6 xi
iﬀ i 6 x0
j for any i,j ∈ JL] then F(x)=F(x0).
Clearly, IQC establishes that membership requires certiﬁcation of eligibil-
ity by another member, while PC simply requires voluntariness of member-
ship. CSD is a no-cooptation property which amounts to imposing identity of
the set of members under reversal of roles between certiﬁcators and nominees.
We shall then proceed to introduce and characterize some CIPs, relying
on the foregoing axioms.
To begin with, we consider two CIPs which satisfy IQC while not disal-
lowing cooptation.
Deﬁnition 1 The Extended Qualiﬁed Nomination (EQN) procedure6:






j ∈ JL : there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 , {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL
and i ∈ {i1,..,ik}\{j} such that




In plain words, EQN identiﬁes as members the nominees of some agent7
in some circle of nominees where each agent is nominated by her succes-
sor/neighbour.
Deﬁnition 2 The Participatory Extended Qualiﬁed Nomination (PEQN)






j ∈ JL : there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 , {i1,..,i k} ⊆ JL
and i ∈ {i1,..,ik}\{j} such that
h 6 xh ∧ xh+1(modk) for any h ∈ {i1,..,ik} and




6The suﬃx (modk) (following an addition) which is introduced below denotes k-
modular sum namely sum in the ﬁnite group Z/k (where k is any positive integer).
7The term ‘agent’ shall be henceforth used to denote any relevant population unit
namely any element of JL.
3Thus, PEQN identiﬁes as members the consenting nominees of some agent
who belong to some circle of nominees where each agent is nominated by her
successor/neighbour and declares herself a member.
EQN and PEQN can be readily characterized as follows:
Proposition 3 FE satisﬁes IQC. Moreover, for any CIP F : LJL → L,i f
F satisﬁes IQC then F 5 FE.
Proof. Let us consider x ∈ LJL and j ∈ JL such that j 6 FE(x).T h e n
there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2, {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL and i ∈ {i1,..,i k}\{j} such that
#{i1,..,ik} = k, ih 6 xih+1(mod k) for any h ∈ {1,..,k},a n dj 6 xj ∧ xi.
Moreover, by deﬁnition, ih 6 FE(x) for any h ∈ {1,..,k} and j 6= i hence
FE does indeed satisfy IQC.
Now, let F be a CIP that satisﬁes IQC.
For any x ∈ LJL and j ∈ JL such that j 6 F(x),t h e r ee x i s t si1 ∈ JL, i1 6=
j such that i1 6 F(x) and j 6 xi1, by IQC. But then, by IQC again, there
exists i2 ∈ JL, i2 6= i1 such that i2 6 F(x) and i1 6 xi2. By repeating the
argument, and in view of ﬁniteness of JL, we may conclude that there exist
k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 and #{i1,..,i k} = k, {i1,..,i k} ⊆ JL such that h 6 xh+1(modk)
and h 6 F(x) for any h ∈ {i1,..,ik}. Thus, by deﬁnition, j 6 FE(x) as
required.
Proposition 4 FPE satisﬁes IQC and PC. Moreover, for any CIP F :
LJL → L,i fF satisﬁes IQC and PC then F 5 FPE.
Proof. Let us consider x ∈ LJL and j ∈ JL such that j 6 FPE(x).T h e n
there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2, {i1,..,i k} ⊆ JL and i ∈ {i1,..,ik}\{j} such
that #{i1,..,ik} = k, ih 6 xih ∧ xih+1(mod k) for any h ∈ {1,..,k},a n dj 6
xi.M o r e o v e r , b y d e ﬁnition, ih 6 FPE(x) for any h ∈ {1,..,k} and j 6= i
hence FPE does indeed satisfy IQC. It is straightforward to check that, by
deﬁnition, FPEsatisﬁes PC as well.
Let F be a CIP that satisﬁes IQC and PC. For any x ∈ LJL and j ∈ JL
such that j 6 F(x),t h e r ee x i s t si1 ∈ JL, i1 6= j such that i1 6 F(x) and
j 6 xj ∧ xi1, by IQC and PC. But then, by IQC again, there exists i2 ∈ JL,
i2 6= i1 such that i2 6 F(x) and i1 6 xi2. By repeating the argument, and in
view of ﬁniteness of JL, we may conclude that there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 and
#{i1,..,ik} = k, {i1,..,i k} ⊆ JL such that h 6 xh∧xh+1(modk) and h 6 F(x)
for any h ∈ {i1,..,i k}. Thus, by deﬁnition, j 6 FPE(x).
4Clearly enough, both EQN and PEQN explicitly allow cooptation of mem-
bers (namely, nominees who are not members of the basic ‘circle’ are coopted
by some member within such ‘circle’).
Let us then turn to some CIPs that satisfy IQC and disallow cooptation
practices.
Deﬁnition 5 The Restricted Qualiﬁed Nomination (RQN) procedure:






j ∈ JL : there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 and {i1,..,i k} ⊆ JL
such that j ∈ {i1,..,i k}




Hence, by deﬁnition, the RQN procedure identiﬁes as members those
agents who belong to some circle of nominees where each agent is nominated
by her successor/neighbour.
Deﬁnition 6 The Participatory Restricted Qualiﬁed Nomination (PRQN)






j ∈ JL : there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 and {i1,..,i k} ⊆ JL
such that j ∈ {i1,..,i k}




Again, the PRQN procedure is a voluntary version of RQN, namely it
identiﬁes as members those agents who belong to some circle of nominees
where each agent is nominated by her successor/neighbour and declares her-
self to qualify as a member.
RQN and PRQN are also amenable to an easy characterization in terms
of our axioms, as presented by the following results.
Proposition 7 FR satisﬁes IQC and CSD. Moreover, for any CIP F :
LJL → L,i fF satisﬁes IQC and CSD then F 5 F R.
Proof. Let us consider x ∈ LJL and j ∈ JL such that j 6 FR(x).T h e n
there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 and {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL such that #{i1,..,i k} = k,
j = ih∗ ∈ {i1,..,i k} for some h∗ ∈ {1,..,k},a n dih 6 xih+1(mod k) for any
h ∈ {1,..,k}.M o r e o v e r , b y d e ﬁnition, ih 6 FR(x) for any h ∈ {1,..,k}.
Since k ≥ 2 i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a ti np a r t i c u l a rj 6= ih∗+1(modk) hence F R
does indeed satisfy IQC.
5Moreover, let x,x0 ∈ LJL be such that [j 6 xi iﬀ i 6 x0
j for any i,j ∈ JL].
Next, take any j ∈ JL such that j 6 F R(x). Then, by deﬁnition, there exist
k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 and {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL such that #{i1,..,i k} = k, j ∈ {i1,..,ik}
and h 6 xh+1(modk) for any h ∈ {i1,..,ik}.B u tt h e n ,h +1 ( m o dk) 6 x0
h for
any h+1(modk) ∈ {i1,..,ik} = {i0
1,..,i0
k} where i0
h = ik−h+1(modk), h =1 ,..,k.
Therefore, equivalently, h 6 x0
h+1(modk) for any h ∈ {i0
1,..,i 0
k}. It follows that,
by deﬁnition, j 6 FR(x0) whence FR(x) 6 F R(x0).S i n c e (x0)0 = x,b ya
similar argument FR(x0) 6 F R(x).T h u s ,FR(x)=FR(x0) i.e. F R satisﬁes
CSD.
Now, let F be a CIP that satisﬁes IQC and CSD.
For any x ∈ LJL and j ∈ JL such that j 6 F(x),t h e r ee x i s t si1 ∈ JL, i1 6=
j such that i1 6 F(x) and j 6 xi1, by IQC. But then, by IQC again, there
exists i2 ∈ JL, i2 6= i1 such that i2 6 F(x) and i1 6 xi2. By repeating the
argument, and in view of ﬁniteness of JL, we may conclude that there exist
k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 and #{i1,..,i k} = k, {i1,..,i k} ⊆ JL such that h 6 xh+1(modk)
and h 6 F(x) for any h ∈ {i1,..,ik},a n dj 6 F(x).I f j ∈ {i1,..,ik} then
j 6 FR(x) and we are done. Let us then assume that j/ ∈ {i1,..,i k} for any
such set {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL. Hence in particular ih ­ xj for any ih ∈ {i1,..,ik}
(otherwise, one might consider {i1,..,ih,j} ⊆ JL, which would violate our
previous assumption). Next, take x0 ∈ LJL such that [i 6 x0
l iﬀ l 6 xi
for any i,l ∈ JL].T h e r e f o r e , j ­ x0
ih for any such {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL and
any ih ∈ {i1,..,ik}.B y I Q C i t f o l l o w s t h a t j ­ F(x0), while CSD entails
j 6 F(x0), a contradiction. Thus, j ∈ {i1,..,i k} whence j 6 FR(x).
Proposition 8 FPR satisﬁes IQC, CSD and PC. Moreover, for any CIP
F : LJL → L,i fF satisﬁes IQC, CSD and PC then F 5 FPR.
Proof. Let us consider x ∈ LJL and j ∈ JL such that j 6 FPR(x).T h e n
there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 and {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL such that #{i1,..,i k} = k,
j = ih ∈ {i1,..,i k}, j 6 xih ∧ xih+1(mod k) and ih+1(modk) 6 xih+2(mod k). Clearly,
by deﬁnition, ih 6 FPR(x) for any h ∈ {1,..,k}.S i n c ek ≥ 2 it must be the
case that j 6= ih+1(modk) 6= ih+2(modk) hence by deﬁnition again, F PR satisﬁes
IQC.
Moreover, let x,x0 ∈ LJL be such that [j 6 xi iﬀ i 6 x0
j for any i,j ∈
JL]. Next, take any j ∈ JL such that j 6 FPR(x). Then, by deﬁnition,
there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2 and {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL such that #{i1,..,i k} = k,
j ∈ {i1,..,ik} and h 6 xh ∧ xh+1(modk) for any h ∈ {i1,..,ik}.B u t t h e n ,
6h+1(modk) 6 x0
h+1∧x0




h = ik−h+1(modk), h =1 ,..,k. Therefore, equivalently, h 6 x0
h ∧ x0
h+1(modk)
for any h ∈ {i0
1,..,i 0
k}.I t f o l l o w s t h a t , b y d e ﬁnition, j 6 FPR(x0) whence
FPR(x) 6 F PR(x0).S i n c e (x0)0 = x, by a similar argument FPR(x0) 6
FPR(x).T h u s ,F PR(x)=FPR(x0) i.e. FPR also satisﬁes CSD.
Finally, FPR clearly satisﬁes PC, by deﬁnition.
Now, let F be a CIP that satisﬁes IQC, CSD and PC.
For any x ∈ LJL and j ∈ JL such that j 6 F(x),t h e r ee x i s t si1 ∈ JL,
i1 6= j such that i1 6 F(x) and j 6 xi1,b yI Q C .M o r e o v e r ,j 6 xj by
PC. But then, by IQC and PC again, there exists i2 ∈ JL, i2 6= i1 such
that i2 6 F(x), i2 6 xi2 and i1 6 xi2. By repeating the argument, and
in view of ﬁniteness of JL, we may conclude that there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 2
and #{i1,..,i k} = k, {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL such that h 6 xh ∧ xh+1(modk) for any
h ∈ {i1,..,ik},a n dj 6 F(x).B u tt h e n ,t a k ex0 ∈ LJL such that [j 6 xi iﬀ
i 6 x0
j for any i,j ∈ JL]. Therefore, by CSD, j 6 F(x0) which violates IQC.
Thus, j ∈ {i1,..,ik} whence j 6 FPR(x).
If j ∈ {i1,..,i k} then j 6 FPR(x) and we are done. Let us then assume
that j/ ∈ {i1,..,i k} for any such set {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL.H e n c e i n p a r t i c u l a r
ih ­ xj for any ih ∈ {i1,..,i k} (otherwise, one might consider {i1,..,i h,j} ⊆
JL, which would violate our previous assumption). Next, take x0 ∈ LJL
such that [i 6 x0
l iﬀ l 6 xi for any i,l ∈ JL]. Therefore, j ­ x0
ih for
any such {i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL and any ih ∈ {i1,..,ik}. By IQC it follows that
j ­ F(x0),w h i l ej 6 F(x) and CSD entail j 6 F(x0), a contradiction. Thus,
j ∈ {i1,..,i k} whence j 6 FPR(x).
2.2 Axiom Independence
It is easily checked that FPEsatisﬁes IQC and PC but violates CSD, while
FR satisﬁes IQC and CSD but violates PC. Next, consider the following
well-known identiﬁcation rule
Deﬁnition 9 Libertarian (L*) procedure: for any x ∈ LJL,
FL∗(x)=
_
{j ∈ JL : j 6 xj }8
8Hence, the libertarian rule identiﬁes as members precisely those agents who declare
themselves to qualify as members.
7It is straightforward to check that FL∗ satisﬁes PC9 and CSD but fails to
satisfy IQC. Thus, IQC, PC and CSD are mutually independent axioms.
Of course, FL∗ also satisﬁes the arrowian independence condition, namely
Independence (IND): For any x,x0 ∈ LJL and any j ∈ JL if [for all
i ∈ JL: j 6 xi iﬀ j 6 x0
j] then [j 6 F(x) iﬀ j 6 F(x0)].
Another well-known identiﬁcation rule is the following
Deﬁnition 10 Unanimous Consent (UC) procedure: for any x ∈ LJL,
FL∗(x)=
_
{j ∈ JL : j 6 xi for all i ∈ JL }10
Now, UC also satisﬁes IND ( and therefore violates IQC): moreover, it
satisﬁes PC but also violates CSD (to check the last claim, just consider the
case of a proﬁle that unanimously declares exactly one agent as the only
qualiﬁed one).
As mentioned in the Introduction some CIPs which do not satisfy IND
have also been introduced and studied in the relevant literature (see e.g.
Kasher and Rubinstein (1996), Dimitrov, Sung and Xu (2003))11,n a m e l y
Deﬁnition 11 The Liberal Multi-level Qualiﬁed Nomination (LMQN)






j ∈ JL : there exist k ∈ Z, k ≥ 1,a n d{i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL
such that
i1 6 xi1




Thus, LMQN may be regarded as a two-stage procedure which identiﬁes
as members both the agents who declare themselves to qualify as members
and their nominees.
9Indeed, F 5 FL∗
for any CIP F : LJL → L that satisﬁes PC.
10Hence, the unanimous consent procedure identiﬁes as members precisely those agents
that are unanimously declared to qualify for membership. That is far from being an
irrelevant, far-fetched procedure: indeed, it may be regarded as a convenient model of
those voluntary aﬃliations where qualiﬁcations consist of essentially veriﬁable information
(e.g. professional and related associations).
11To be sure, those authors use ‘Independence’ as a label for a much weaker conditional
version of the arrowian-like Independence deﬁned above. Indeed, such a Kasher-Rubinstein
weakened independence is satisﬁed by the UCQN and LMQN procedures deﬁned below as
well as by the IQC-consistent procedures previously considered in the text.
8Deﬁnition 12 The Consensual Multi-level Qualiﬁed Nomination (CMQN)






j ∈ JL : there exist k ∈ Z,k ≥ 1,a n d{i1,..,ik} ⊆ JL
such that
i1 6 xi for each i ∈ JL




Clearly, CMQN may also be regarded as a two-stage procedure which
identiﬁes as members precisely all the agents who are unanimously declared
to qualify and their nominees.
It is worth considering, for the sake of comparisons, the behavior of the
foregoing procedures in terms of the axioms considered in the present work.
Indeed, it is easily checked that FLM fails to satisfy IQC, PC or CSD. In
contrast, it can be easily shown that FCM does satisfy IQC but violates both
PC and CSD. One might easily devise a ‘participatory’ version of FCM (to be
deﬁned in the obvious way) which would satisfy IQC and PC while violating
CSD.
3C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The main point of the present work is to show by example that there is a
rich variety of collective identiﬁcation procedures worth considering that do
not satisfy the classic arrowian independence condition. In particular, I have
focussed on the Independent Qualiﬁed Certiﬁcation requirement, but other
possibilities might be considered. The procedures discussed in the current pa-
per are probably best regarded as stylized ‘ideal’ paradigms, mostly useful as
reference models for classiﬁcatory purposes. However, this is not to say they
are unrelated to ‘real’ collective identiﬁcation procedures. On the contrary,
it seems to me that virtually all the procedures considered in the former
sections may claim a rather close similarity to some classes of historically
relevant examples. For instance, while aﬃliations to most political parties
in contemporary democracies essentially rely on libertarian procedures such
as L*, admissions to some of their former counterparts operating under nazi-
fascist regimes relied on versions of the PEQN procedure as introduced above
in Section 2.1. Moreover, one might perhaps claim that 16th century’s vi-
cious conﬂict between Catholics and mainstream Protestant denominations
on one side and Anabaptists on the other concerning the validity of early (i.e.
infant) baptism is at least to some extent captured by the contrast between
9EQN and PEQN. On a more frivolous tone, the same PEQN (as opposed to,
say, L*) is arguably a rather good stylized version of the typical admission
procedures used by the best tennis clubs.
Be it as it may, this is certainly not the place to dwell on a serious
discussion of those putative historical or common life examples. Rather,
a few speciﬁc comments on the IQC-consistent procedures introduced and
studied in the present paper are in order here.
First, it should be clear at this point that the IQC principle entails the ex-
istence of some ‘virtuous circles’ of mutually sustaining certiﬁcations, which
may be regarded as a social analogue of certain autocatalic chemical reactions
as nicely epitomized by Eigen’s well-known ‘hypercycles’ (see e.g. Hofbauer
and Sigmund (1988)). In particular, such ‘virtuous circles’ may be partic-
ularly appropriate as an idealized model of the ‘constitutional’ phase of an
association.
It should also be remarked that CIPs that satisfy IQC may well be con-
sistent with the reality of ‘contested identities’ namely with the existence of
several (possibly disjoint) subcommunities claiming the same identity. This
can be prevented by introducing appropriate supplementary axioms.
Finally, it should be noticed that CIPs are nothing but strategic game
forms of a highly specialized sort. Therefore, their structural properties are
amenable to further analysis through the study of their concept lattices along
the lines of Vannucci (1999).
Those topics, however, are both best left as the subjects of some further
research.
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